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Abstract 
As the nature of trafficking in persons continues to manifest itself in myriad ways all over the 
world, interpretation of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children (Trafficking Protocol), should be broadened to 
include newly emerging practices that are similar in nature to those it has already embraced 
under its definition. The Protocol appears to encompass other forms of trafficking which are 
unnamed or unforeseen by the definition provided under Article 3. It is time to expand its 
spectrum. Northeast Africa is plagued by a unique form of trafficking in persons—trafficking in 
persons for ransom. This involves a practice where people are smuggled, abducted, kidnapped 
and tortured to compel their relatives and families to pay ransom money. Victims are 
nationals of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan. However, as Northeast Africa hosts 
particularly high numbers of Eritrean migrants and the largest Eritrean diaspora globally, 
Eritreans are very vulnerable to being targeted for trafficking for ransom. As trafficking for 
ransom is an emerging trend, legal ramifications have never been studied in full. Few reports 
try to address legal issues around the phenomenon, and those that do only give it a few 
paragraphs of attention. There is need for a closer look at this form of trafficking.  
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Reality in Northeast Africa reflects the intricate nature of migration, smuggling and 
trafficking in persons. Inside the region, migrants are trafficked for ransom, which involves 
being smuggled, abducted, kidnapped and kept as hostages.
1
 In hostage camps, captives are 
tortured often while on the phone with relatives or friends, as a means to expedite the 
payment of ransom.  
 
The harsh political and economic reality in Eritrea is attributed as the main reason Eritrean 
nationals flee at an alarming rate. Desperate journeys in search of safety and security make 
                                            
1  The research is based on secondary data of recorded and compiled interviews with victims and other actors in trafficking in 
persons: Human Rights Watch, (HRW), ‘Eritrea, Service for Life State Repression and Indefinite Conscription in Eritrea’, HRW, 
2009; HRW, ‘“I Wanted to Lie Down and Die” Trafficking and Torture of Eritreans in Sudan and Egypt’, HRW, 2014; HRW, 
‘Yemen’s Torture Camps, Abuse of Migrants by Human Traffickers in a Climate of Impunity’, HRW, 2014; M van Reisen, M 
Estefanos & C Rijken, Human Trafficking in the Sinai: Refugees between Life and Death, Nijmegen: Wolf Publishers, 2012; M 
van Reisen, M Estefanos & C Rijken, The Human Trafficking Cycle: Sinai and Beyond, Nijmegen: Wolf Publishers, 2014; 
Amnesty International, ‘Egypt/Sudan Refugees and Asylum Seekers Face Brutal Treatment, Kidnapping for Ransom and 
Human Trafficking’, Amnesty International, 2013.  
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Eritrean migrants vulnerable to traffickers. The traffickers are organised criminal groups who 
build livelihoods on the continuous flow of migrants and take advantage of the social, 
political and economic repression in Eritrea. The legal response to this problem in the 
countries of origin, transit and destination is very weak. Almost all countries affected lack a 
comprehensive legal framework and show limited interest in investigating and prosecuting the 
act inside or outside their territories. Trafficking in persons for ransom is one of the newest 
patterns of trafficking in persons. Records show that apart from Northeast Africa, the practice 
has plagued the Middle East (Yemen), Southeast Asia (Burma, Malaysia and Thailand) and 
North America (Mexico), 2 and yet it is one of the most poorly studied forms of trafficking. A 
few existing reports attempt to link trafficking for ransom with trafficking for debt bondage 
and/or forced begging, and a careful assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case 
reveals the limitation of Article 3 of the Trafficking Protocol in addressing the problem. This 
article provides a wider perspective on the issue and tries to demonstrate unique features of 
trafficking for ransom by focusing on the experiences of Eritreans who constitute a relatively 
large proportion of those experiencing it. The article looks at ways in which trafficking for 
ransom can be included in interpretations of the Trafficking Protocol, and it makes the case 
for states to look at the possibility of amending their national anti-trafficking legislation and 
policy to specifically include trafficking for ransom. 
 
 
Trends of Trafficking for Ransom in Northeast Africa and the Middle East 
Eritrea, situated in Northeast Africa, is a country of origin for the highest number of people in 
migration, smuggling and/or trafficking situations in Ethiopia, Egypt, Libya and Sudan and, to 
certain extent, Yemen. In 1998, the border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia claimed the 
lives of hundreds of thousands of people, displaced thousands of citizens and destroyed 
economic infrastructure. The Eritrean government follows an isolationist policy in handling 
the war and post-war impacts which has already resulted in increased political hardship and 
violations of fundamental human rights.
3
 Especially since 2001, the human rights situation in 
the country has gradually degraded.
4
 Eritreans began to flee the country in larger numbers to 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Djibouti and Yemen. As the influx increased, particularly since 2006, trends 
started to portray intertwined characteristics of smuggling and trafficking affecting the 
neighbouring countries. An intermix of smuggling, deceit, abduction, coercion, abuse and 
extortion has led some observers to the conclusion that the trends partly constitute human 
                                            
2  HRW, ‘Yemen’s Torture Camps’, p. 34, retrieved 28 May 2014, 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/yemen0514_ForUpload.pdf . People of the ethno-religious minority 
Rohingya who flee Burma to escape religious persecution are sold by Thai officials to traffickers in Malaysia who in turn hold 
them in hidden camps ‘until relatives pay thousands of dollars to release them.’ See also J Szep & A Marshall, ‘Thailand’s 
clandestine Rohingya Policy Uncovered’, Thomson Reuters, 2013, p. 2, retrieved 1 December 2014, 
http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/13/12/ROHINGYA-THAILAND.pdf .  In Mexico, criminal gangs kidnap migrants who 
follow routes through Mexico and keep them hostage forcing them to reveal telephone numbers of their relatives and 
demand ransom. Amnesty International, ‘Invisible Victims: Migrants on the Move in Mexico’, Amnesty International, 2010, pp. 
11 and 17, retrieved 14 January 2015, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR41/014/2010/en/8459f0ac-03ce-4302-
8bd2-3305bdae9cde/amr410142010eng.pdf 
3 HRW, ‘Eritrea, Service for Life’, p.3, retrieved 2 March 2014, 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/eritrea0409web_0.pdf; M van Reisen et al., ‘Human Trafficking in the 
Sinai’, p.16. 
4 Ibid., the pinpointed reason for people’s discontent that causes migration is conscription of adults into the Eritrean National 
Service for indefinite periods of time. Eritrean National Service Proclamation No.82/1995 obliges citizens between 18–50 
years old to take part, for eighteen months, in military training and national development programmes with inadequate 
remuneration. After the outbreak of the war with Ethiopia, a de facto state of emergency was declared and extended the 
time to an unlimited period.  
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trafficking.
5
 Although the problem also affects nationals of Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan, 
because Northeast Africa hosts particularly high numbers of Eritrean migrants and the largest 
Eritrean diaspora globally, Eritreans are very vulnerable to being targeted for trafficking for 
ransom. 
 
Moreover, the countries become increasingly recognised as having multiple roles as countries 
of origin, transit and destination for trafficking. The trend of trafficking follows three main 
migration routes. The first route is an Eritrea-(Ethiopia)-Sudan-Egypt route where by the 
majority of Eritreans flee to Sudan directly or via Ethiopia with smugglers. In some cases, 
smugglers turn out to be traffickers at certain destinations and surprise migrants who are not 
aware of the fact that they have been smuggled by traffickers.
6
 After crossing the Sudanese 
border, many are forcefully picked up and transported to Sinai, Egypt. Trafficking starts from 
Ethiopian territory where incidences of kidnapping incidents have been reported in Mai Aini 
and Shimelba refugee camps.
7
 Similarly in Sudan, trafficking also begins with abduction and 
kidnapping taking place in and around Shegarab refugee camp, mainly by members of the 
Rashaida ethnic group.
8
 Victims are transferred to final hostage takers passing through a chain 
of financial arrangements or deals between different traffickers.
9
 Numbers of cases also 
involve collaboration of Eritrean, Sudanese and Egyptian police and security forces who take 
part in and facilitate the kidnapping and transportation of victims for hostage taking.
10
 For a 
number of cases, traffickers demand ransom money, which may be as high as USD 16,000.
11
 
Upon payment, migrants are either freed or sold to other traffickers in Egypt’s Sinai.
12
 At the 
main locations of El Arish, El Masouraand Al Mahdiain the Sinai, some members of the 
minority Bedouin tribes force payment of up to USD 50,000 per person.
13
 Different techniques 
of torture are applied to facilitate payment including whipping, burning bodies with molten 
plastics, electrocution, hanging and drowning the victims in water while they are in telephone 
conversation with their families.
14
 Hundreds die due to the dire hostage situations.
15
 Those 
                                            
5 D Connell, ‘Refugees at Risk’, Foreign Policy in Focus, 11 April  2014, retrieved 9 May 2014, 
http://www.danconnell.net/sites/default/files/Eritrean%20Refugees%20at%20Risk.pdf 
6   R Humphris, ‘Refugees and the Rashaida: Human smuggling and trafficking from Eritrea to Sudan and Egypt’, UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2013, p .22, retrieved 4 March 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/51407fc69.pdf 
7    M van Reisen et al., ‘Human Trafficking in the Sinai’, pp. 25 & 40; Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, ‘Hundreds of Refugees 
Held Hostage in Sinai Torture Camps Need Rescuing’, 2012, retrieved 4 March 2014, 
http://www.phr.org.il/default.asp?PageID=183&ItemID=1176 ; HRW, ‘I Wanted to Lie Down and Die’, p. 22.  
8 M van Reisen et al., pp. 28 & 30; The Rashaida ethnic groups are recent migrants from the Arabian Peninsula into Africa who 
practice pastoralism around the borders of Eritrea, Sudan and Southern Egypt. See also R Humphris, Refugees and the 
Rashaida, p.2. At first, members of this group helped Eritrean migrants with an illicit border crossing. Later, they began to 
exploit worsening situations in Eritrea that lead to a greater influx of migrants. With collaborators in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan 
and abroad, they facilitate the abduction and kidnapping of Eritrean migrants and ask ransom of their families. They have 
formed new criminal networks or built on existing ones; see also L Lijnders & S Robinson, ‘From the Horn of Africa to the 
Middle East: Human trafficking of Eritrean asylum seekers across borders’, Anti-Trafficking Review, issue 2, 2013, pp.147 & 
149. 
9 M van Reisen et al., ‘Human Trafficking in the Sinai’, p. 25. 
10 HRW, ‘I Wanted to Lie Down and Die’, pp. 42–47; Tom Dale, ‘Are Eritrean and Egyptian Officials Profiting From Torture?’, 
Vice, 12 February 2014, retrieved 4 March 2015, http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/egypt-eritrea-trafficking-sinai 
11 HRW, ‘I Wanted to Lie Down and Die’, p.12; D Connell, ‘The Rerouted Trafficking in Eritrean Refugees’, Middle East Research 
and Information Project, vol. 43, 2013, retrieved 10 Oct 2013, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer268/rerouted-trafficking-
eritrean-refugees; M van Reisen et al., ‘Human Trafficking in the Sinai’, p.28.  
12 R Humphris, ‘Refugees and the Rashaida’, p. 12. The Bedouins are typically socially and economically marginalised people 
who avoid government control around borders of Eritrea, Sudan and southern Egypt. Some among the members of this group 
build lives along borders and routes to Israel, making money through illicit smuggling of trafficked persons, drugs and 
weapons.  
13 Ibid.,  p. 4; see The CNN Freedom Project, ‘Stand in Sinai now Online’, 26 September 2012, retrieved 5 March 2014, 
http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com/2012/09/26/stand-in-the-sinai-now-online/ ; D Connell, ‘The Rerouted 
Trafficking in Eritrean Refugees’; L Lijnders and S Robinson, ‘From the Horn of Africa to the Middle East’, p.139. 
14 The CNN Freedom Project, ‘Stand in Sinai now Online’; The 1984 Convention against Torture defines torture as ‘any act by 
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person … by or at the instigation of 
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity…’ However, since 
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who are not able to pay are often killed by the traffickers.
16
 Between 2006 and 2012, Israel 
was a destination for most of the fleeing migrants.
17
 In 2012, the Israeli government renewed 
its anti-infiltration regulation and fenced its border to deter the growing number of African 
migrants.
18
 Another deterrent was the shoot-to-kill measures carried out by Egyptian border 
patrol guards at the Israeli border.
19
 Due to these measures, while the overall flow of 
migrants through Egypt significantly reduced, numbers of people released on payment and 
those who escape the torture camps and return to Cairo have increased.
20
 
 
Since 2013, most migrants have taken the second route Eritrea-(Ethiopia)-Sudan-Libya. The 
trafficking pattern has also shifted to this route. To date, large influxes of Eritrean migrants 
follow this route hoping to cross to Europe from Libya.
21
 Many organised criminals smuggle 
and traffic migrants from all over the continent. In most cases, Eritreans coming directly or 
via Ethiopia gather in Sudan and are led by smugglers across the Libyan border. Other 
traffickers pick up the migrants at the border and keep them in places like Ajdabiya, for 
extortion.
22
 In some cases, migrants who made it to the Libyan territory are kidnapped and 
transferred for ransom and afterwards handed over to other groups who take additional 
money to arrange for their journey by sea to Europe.
23
 Traffickers are nationals of Sudan, 
Tunisia, Libya, Somalia and Eritrea who physically and mentally assault hostages, with tactics 
                                                                                                                                            
traffickers are mainly a group of individuals, trafficking for ransom seems to fall outside the spectrum of this definition. A 
flexible interpretation of the definition could lead to States’ liability for failure to exercise due diligence to investigate and 
punish acts of torture committed by private actors or organised criminals that may amount to a State’s facilitation or 
complicity with the private operations. Further, in the UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 2004, paragraph 8, States are 
required to ‘prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts [violations] by private persons or entities’. 
In addition, the fact that some security officers collude with traffickers amounts to a State’s complicity in the unlawful 
practice. See also Article 1, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
December 1984, retrieved 5 April 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx; see also A v United 
Kingdom [1998] ECHR 22 & H.L.R. v France [1997] ECHR 30; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Report of 
United Nations Committee against Torture’, 49th and 50th Session,  2013,  p. 255,  retrieved 5 April 2014, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=HRI%2fGEN%2f1%2fRev.9%20(Vol.%20I)&L
ang=en 
15    M van Reisen et al., ‘Human Trafficking in the Sinai’, p. 48; H Sherwood, ‘Hundreds of Eritreans enslaved in torture camps in 
Sudan and Egypt’, The Guardian, 11 February 2014, retrieved 9 March 2014,  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/11/eritreans-enslaved-traffickers-sudan-egypt-torture-camps 
16   S M Weldehaimanot, ‘Kidnapping, Hostage-Taking And Ransoming Of Eritrean Asylum Seekers In The Sinai Desert’, Release 
Eritrea, 2011, p. 16, retrieved 18 February 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1932457; M van 
Reisen et al., ‘Human Trafficking in the Sinai’, pp. 40 & 52. 
17  UNHCR, ‘Population Statistics’, http://popstats.unhcr.org/PSQ_RSD.aspx; HRW, ‘“Make Their Lives Miserable” Israel’s 
Coercion of Eritrean and Sudanese Asylum Seekers to Leave Israel’, HRW, 2014, p.17, retrieved 2 October 2014, 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/israel0914_ForUpload_1.pdf 
18  M Omer-Man, ‘The Origin and Politics of Israeli’s Refugee Debate’, +972, 28 January 2014, retrieved 18 February 2015, 
http://972mag.com/the-origins-and-politics-of-israels-refugee-debate/86180/ . The new regulation authorises detention of 
infiltrators for three years with the possibility of renewing until deportation. In addition, fences recently built along the 
border made crossing impossible. 
19  HRW, ‘I Wanted to Lie Down and Die’, p. 26. 
20    T Dale, ‘Sinai Trafficking Victims Face Hardship in Cairo as they Await Resettlement’, The Guardian, 9 May 2014, retrieved 
25 Jan 2015,http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/may/09/sinai-trafficking-victims-cairo-resettlement 
21   US  Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2013, pp. 397-399; M Manrique, J Barna, P Hakala, B Rey & E Claros, 
‘In-Depth Analysis Mediterranean flows into Europe: Migration and the EU's foreign policy, European Union’, 2014, p. 5, 
retrieved 18 February 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/euroscola/resource/static/files/mediterranean-flows.pdf 
22 Xinhua, ‘Somali man arrested over Lampedusa migrants' ship tragedy’, 9 November 2013, retrieved 18 February 2015, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-11/09/c_132874172.htm; Human Rights Concern, ‘Eritrean Refugees in 
Libya: Forced to Clear Land Mines’, Asmarino Independent, 19 March 2013, retrieved 20 May 2014, 
http://asmarino.com/press-releases/1690-eritrean-refugees-in-libya-forced-to-clear-land-mines 
23  M Schwartz, ‘Letter from Lampedusa: The Anchor’, The New Yorker,  21 April 2014, retrieved 29  April 2014, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2014/04/21/140421fa_fact_schwartz April 21 2014 
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including various methods of torture and rape.24 The amount of money usually requested is 
relatively very small reaching up to USD 3,000.25 
 
The third, currently active, migration route includes Eritrea-(Djibouti)-Yemen. Though 
relatively small in number, Eritreans who follow this route also face risk of kidnapping, 
torture and ransom inside the territory of Yemen. The majority of the victims are nationals of 
Ethiopia and Somalia.
26
 Migrants who cross the Red Sea to the shores of Yemen are abducted 
and kept hostage for ransom. Since 2006, organised criminal groups operate in smuggling 
networks extending through Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Saudi Arabia.27 Trafficking 
intensified as desperate migrants were kidnapped and detained for ransom by traffickers in 
the desert camp around Haradh.
28
 Migrants pass through chains of sales or deals between 
different gang groups before reaching their final destination.
29
 Inside Yemen, the sales start 
when migrants reach the shore and are picked up by traffickers who pay boat crews USD 133 
per head.
30
 Traffickers sell the migrants to other traffickers who run their own independent 
camps.31 Migrants are kept in the camps where they are forced to make phone calls to ask for 
money of amounts up to USD 1,300.
32
 Treatment of hostages in these camps is similar to 
Sinai’s torture camps where captives are beaten, sexually harassed and raped to facilitate 
payment.  
 
 
Trafficking for Ransom under Article 3 of the Trafficking Protocol 
The 2000 Trafficking Protocol adopted to supplement the UN Convention on Transnational 
Organized Crime (UNTOC) was part of the response to a global ‘need for a comprehensive 
international approach’ to address ‘all aspects of trafficking in persons.’
33
 The Protocol makes 
a significant shift by specifying that victims of human trafficking are not criminals.
34
 It 
centres on three objectives: prevention and combating of trafficking in persons, protection of 
victims of the crime, and promotion of cooperation among States.
35
 The Protocol widened the 
scope of the definition of trafficking at the time to accommodate protection against other 
forms of exploitation in addition to forced prostitution and forced labour.
36
 Other forms of 
exploitation specifically mentioned in the Protocol are organ removal, slavery and slavery-like 
practices and servitude.
37
 The scope also extends to trafficking of men and boys, though it 
gives special attention to women and children.
38
 Under Article 3, trafficking in persons is 
defined to mean:  
 
                                            
24    Ibid.  
25 Agence France-Press,‘Lampedusa shipwreck migrants 'raped by traffickers', The Telegraph, 8 November 2013, retrieved 18 
February 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/10436645/Lampedusa-shipwreck-migrants-
raped-by-traffickers.html 
26   HRW, ‘Yemen’s Torture Camps’, p. 22. 
27   Ibid., p. 30. 
28   Ibid., p. 27. 
29   Ibid., p. 30. 
30   Ibid., p. 35. 
31   Ibid., p. 37.  
32   Ibid., pp. 22 & 45.  
33   Preamble, Trafficking Protocol. 
34   Ibid., Articles 6-8.  
35   Ibid., Article 2. 
36   Ibid., Art 3a-c; Article 3, UNTOC. 
37   A D Jordan, ‘The Annotated Guide To The Complete The Complete UN Trafficking Protocol’, International Human Rights Law 
Group, 2009, pp. 9-10, retrieved 18 February 2015, http://www.hrlawgroup.org/resources/content/Traff_AnnoProtocol.pdf 
38   Article 3a,Trafficking Protocol. 
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…the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means 
of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of 
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control 
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a 
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, 
servitude or the removal of organs.  
 
Any organised criminal activity is considered to be trafficking in persons upon proof of 
fulfillment of three elements enshrined in the definition: act, means and purpose. The only 
exception is trafficking of children where the requirement of means is waived.
39
 A careful 
examination of the facts and circumstances related to trafficking of Eritrean migrants for 
ransom easily demonstrates the first two elements of the definition. The last, a purpose of 
exploitation, has been more difficult to demonstrate, primarily because exploitation is 
undefined, and requires attention. 
 
Act, as defined as ‘…recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons…’ 
includes elements that commonly suggest mobility (national or transnational) of people by 
any one or a combination of the means enumerated under the definition. Act in the Eritrean 
context of trafficking signifies transnationality of the crime encompassing the transportation, 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of the victims. It is not clear whether recruitment is a relevant 
consideration in this context; because unlike trafficking in persons for forced labour or sexual 
exploitation, victims are not lured by employment opportunities offered or promised by 
traffickers before they fall into the traffickers’ hands.
40
 A series of acts of receiving and 
harbouring victims takes place during the transporting and transferring of victims as most 
victims have to go thorough chains of sales or deals until they reach the final destination 
where they are harboured for extortion of money from their relatives.
41
 Looking at the facts, 
transferring of Eritrean victims through the chains of deals from one trafficker to another 
uniquely reflects the criminal act element in the trafficking process. 
 
The second element means is defined as: ‘…threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, 
of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or 
of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having 
control over another person…’ Trafficking for ransom mainly involves abduction, deception 
and abuse of position of vulnerability of the victims.
42
 In many cases involving Eritrean 
migrants, abduction also occurs in collaboration with civilian and security officers. Kidnapping 
takes place in towns or refugee camps or en route to borders.
43
 Threat and coercion also 
involve beating, torture, harassment and rape of victims in hostage camps to maintain 
obedience.
44
 Unlike other forms of trafficking, families of victims are systematically 
threatened until they submit to the payment demands of the traffickers.
45
 Delay in payment 
                                            
39  Ibid, Article 3b. 
40  L Lijnders & S Robinson, ‘From the Horn of Africa to the Middle East’, p.143. 
41  HRW, ‘I Wanted to Lie Down and Die’, p. 4. 
42  D Connell, ‘Refugees at Risk’. 
43   Amnesty International, ‘Egypt/Sudan Refugees’, p.10; HRW ‘I Wanted to Lie Down and Die’, p. 23. 
44   D Connell, ‘The Rerouted Trafficking in Eritrean Refugees’.  
45   M van Reisen et al., ‘Human Trafficking in the Sinai’, p. 48; H Sherwood, ‘Hundreds of Eritreans enslaved in torture camps in 
Sudan and Egypt’. 
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may result in serious harm, continued or intensified torture and even death of the captive.
46
 
Using torture as a means to achieve the trafficking purpose is not common among other forms 
of trafficking, though the overall treatment of victims, for instance, in trafficking for sexual 
exploitation or forced labour may amount to torture.
47
 Nonetheless, trafficking for ransom 
clearly meets the means element of the Protocol’s trafficking definition, as abduction, 
deception, abuse of a position of vulnerability, threat and coercion are demonstrably present. 
 
The purpose of trafficking is exploitation, elaborated by the definition as constituting ‘…at a 
minimum the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, 
forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs.’ Exploitation is an oft-noted problematic part of the Protocol, as no definition of 
‘exploitation,’ especially ‘exploitation of the prostitution of others’ and ‘sexual exploitation,’ 
is given by either the Protocol or any other international law.48 The supposedly ‘catch all’ 
phrase, ‘at a minimum’ was intended to ensure the inclusion of additional forms of 
exploitation that are not included in the definition, such as ‘forced marriage’, ‘forced 
adoption’, ‘the purchase or sale of children’ and ‘the making or distribution of child 
pornography.’
49
 Analysts claim the definition provides a non-exhaustive list of exploitation.
50
 
 
The purpose in this case is collection of ransom. In some trafficking for ransom cases, 
purposes outlined in the Protocol’s definition, such as sexual exploitation, forced labour, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, are used as means to arrive at the purpose of collecting 
ransom. While in the hands of traffickers, captives (mainly women) suffered sexual assault or 
rape, and others were forced to work.
51
 The fact that captives are abducted, kidnapped, kept 
under control of the traffickers and sold and transferred through various dealers also portrays 
elements enshrined under the definition of slavery in the 1926 Slavery Convention.
52
 
However, the question as to whether ransom qualifies as exploitation in the Protocol 
definition remains open. 
 
 
Does Exploitation Encompass Ransom? 
Ransom is a commonly recognised crime among various countries mainly linked with 
kidnapping, abducting and taking hostage of individuals.53 Although no international 
framework directly counters ransom, some international conventions can apply to ransom as 
committed in relation with other criminal activities. The 1983 International Convention 
against the Taking of Hostages considers hostage taking as seizing or detaining and 
threatening to kill, to injure or continue to detain any person in order to compel any third 
party ‘to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release 
                                            
46   HRW, ‘I Wanted to Lie Down and Die’, pp. 33, 34 & 37; SM Weldehaimanot, ‘Kidnapping, Hostage-Taking And Ransoming’; M 
van Reisen et al., ‘Human Trafficking in the Sinai’, pp. 62–63. 
47  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, ‘Trafficking in Human Beings Amounting to Torture and other Forms of 
Ill-Treatment’, 2013, pp.14–39, retrieved 26 April 2014, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/51d4158d4.pdf 
48   A D Jordan, ‘The Annotated Guide’, p. 8. 
49  UNTOC, ‘Travaux Préparatoires of  the Negotiations for the Elaboration of the UNTOC and the  Protocols Thereto’, UNTOC, 
2006, p. 344, retrieved 8 June 2014, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/ctoccop_2006/04-60074_ebook-e.pdf 
50   S Scarpa, Trafficking In Human Beings: Modern Slavery, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 5. 
51  HRW,‘I Wanted to Lie Down and Die’, pp. 34–36; see also M van Reisen, et al., ‘Human Trafficking in the Sinai’, p.26. 
52   Article 1, Slavery Convention, 1926; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956; R Humphris, ‘Refugees and the Rashaida’, p.12; M Van Reisen et al., ‘Human 
Trafficking in the Sinai’, pp. 42, 47–57; HRW,‘I Wanted to Lie Down and Die’, pp. 33–36 & 59. 
53   ‘Global Incident Map,’ retrieved 3 Nov 2014, http://www.globalincidentmap.com/beta/kidnapping-for-ransom; see also US 
legislation: 18 U.S. Code § 1201 - Kidnapping. 
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of the hostage.’
54
 The definition of hostage taking and its inclusion of ransom apply to 
practice in Sudan and Egypt as it is common that hostages face kidnapping, abduction, and 
threats of death, injury or continued detention in order to compel relatives to pay ransom as 
a condition for their release.
55
 
 
The Trafficking Protocol does not define the term ‘exploitation’. Neither do other 
international laws. Despite this, it can be understood, from the context, that exploitation 
entails taking advantage of another person. The International Organization of Migration (IOM) 
defines exploitation as ‘the act of taking advantage of something or someone, in particular 
the act of taking unjust advantage of another for one’s own benefit.’
56
  However, the 
meaning of exploitation can go further to imply benefiting of whatsoever as a result of 
contravention with the physical integrity of another person.
57
 Trafficking for ransom meets 
both of these as we see that the traffickers benefit (in this case financially from ransom 
payments) from taking advantage of people they are holding. Taking advantage in practice 
here is both by contravention of physical integrity (as in the second understanding above) or 
further by threats. As a side note, this definition of exploitation includes means (taking 
advantage) within it for the end result of benefit to the trafficker. This is tautological as the 
definition of trafficking then includes a means to exploitation, but then common definitions 
of exploitation include means within them as well. 
 
Limited to the context of trafficking, ransom can be understood as coercive or forceful 
transporting, transferring and harbouring or taking hostage of persons for the purpose of 
extortion of money in exchange for their release. Thus, the intention of the trafficker is to 
threaten the families of captives, forcing them to pay a demanded amount of money. 
Traffickers apply various methods of facilitating extortion which are successful enough to 
motivate them to target more victims. Unlike the categories of exploitation included under 
the Trafficking Protocol definition,
58
 the act of contravention with the victim’s physical 
integrity in this case not only affects the victim, but also impacts third parties in order to 
bring about the desired result. Involving exploitation of more than one class of victims (the 
third-party relatives) portrays a distinct characteristic. Trafficking for sexual exploitation, 
forced labour and organ removal constitute exploitation of only one class of victims who are 
actually kept under the control of their traffickers. The Trafficking Protocol is silent about 
third party victimisation through trafficking, and this should be explored further.
59
 In 
                                            
54  Article 1, International Convention Against Taking of Hostages, G.A.Rea.146, 1938.  
55   R Humphris, ‘Refugees and the Rashaida’, p. 12; M van Reisen, et al., ‘Human Trafficking in the Sinai’, p. 40; Connell, ‘The 
Rerouted Trafficking in Eritrean Refugees’; L Lijnders & S Robinson, ‘From the Horn of Africa to the Middle East’, p.139. 
56   IOM, ‘International Migration Law: Glossary On Migration’, 2004, p. 22, retrieved 10 June 2014, 
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/IML_1_EN.pdf 
57  A G Korvinus et al., ‘Trafficking in Human Beings: The concept of exploitation in the Dutch trafficking provision’, 2006, 
retrieved 18 February 2015, pp. 3–4, http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/4992/file/Article_-
exploitation-in-the-dutch-trafficking-provision_2006_en.pdf  
58  Under the trafficking definition, the concept of exploitation was broadly interpreted in to two categories: labour exploitation 
and sexual exploitation. Organ removal is the third. These three categories have a common characteristic: the act of 
contravention with the victim’s physical integrity. It can be with or without consent. The same could apply to other forms of 
exploitation that were foreseen to be included within the sphere of the definition. Global Alliance against Forced Labour, 
‘Global Report under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’, ILO, 2005, p. 7, 
retrieved 8 June 2014, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_norm/declaration/documents/publication/wcms_081882.pdf ; UNODC, ‘Travaux Préparatoires’, p. 344. 
59  Further study may be needed to determine whether families and friends of captives can be regarded as victims of trafficking 
or victims of threat. Reference was made to third parties affected by trafficking involving labour or sexual exploitation as 
‘derivative victims’ that includes families or dependents of victims who suffered in intervening victims in distress or to 
prevent victimisation. However, it is not clear whether such reference can also be extended to families affected by 
trafficking for ransom due to the fact that intervention by third parties is non-physical, inevitable and enforced constantly. 
See M Y Mattar, ‘Incorporating the Five Basic Elements of a Model Anti trafficking in Persons Legislation in Domestic Laws:  
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addition, intention of the trafficker to gain advantage by contravention with victim’s physical 
integrity does not involve work or service of the victims. 
 
As we explore below, recent research by Reisen et al. links ransom situations with concepts of 
debt bondage and forced begging, which have been defined as forms of exploitation in 
trafficking. In international anti-slavery law, debt bondage is considered a practice similar to 
slavery and thus fits the Trafficking Protocol’s list of possible forms of exploitation which 
includes slavery-like practices.
60
 Forced begging on the other hand is not tied to the Protocol 
as specifically, bar being something that could arguably be included in the non-exhaustive 
listing of examples of exploitation, or arguably be defined as forced labour which is in the 
list.
61
 Nonetheless, linking ransom to debt bondage or forced begging does not particularly 
hold, unfortunately, and this paper maintains that the stronger argument for defining these 
ransom cases as trafficking is made by exploring how ransom can be defined as exploitation, 
as above. 
 
 
The Concept of Ransom and Debt Bondage 
Reisen et al. consider the purpose of the trafficking to be debt bondage and forced begging.
62
 
Their conclusion is based on situations in which trafficked victims are tortured to pay off 
debts and are forced to beg.
63
 In international anti-slavery law, debt bondage is considered a 
practice similar to slavery and is defined as a status or condition arising out of a person’s 
pledge of his personal or third person’s service as security for a debt.
64
 The third person has 
to be under his control and the value of the services, if assessed, ‘is not applied, towards the 
liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited 
and defined.’
65
 In addition, the practice qualifies as a status similar to slavery when the value 
of such services is not defined or limited. In ransom situations, the victims’ pledge of their 
personal or a third person’s service is absent.  
 
In the situation we find in Egypt, Libya, Sudan and Yemen, linking the purpose of trafficking 
with exploitation for debt bondage is tenuous due to the following points. Firstly, there are 
no clear indications that service of captive victims is anticipated by the traffickers. Secondly, 
even if the traffickers may attach the amount of money they spend to buy them as a debt to 
the captives, the threat and force they apply is not to derive profits out of the extorted, but 
is to collect money from the families of the captives.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
From the United Nations Protocol to the European Convention’, Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law,Vol. 
vol 14, no. 1, 2006, p. 27. 
60  Article 1(a) Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
Slavery, 1957.  
61  Though not globally applicable, it has however recently been defined as trafficking-related exploitation in European Union 
(EU) Trafficking Directive (2011/36). ‘Within the context of this Directive, forced begging should be understood as a form of 
forced labour or services as defined in the 1930 ILO Convention No. 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour.’ 
62   M van Reisen et al., p. 80. 
63  Ibid. 
64   Article 1(a) Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
Slavery, 1957.  
65  Ibid. 
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The Concept of Ransom and Forced Begging 
Reisen et al. and others have attempted to link ransom with forced begging.
66
 To show the 
definition of trafficking has been extended, Reisen et al., refer to the recently adopted 
European Union (EU) Trafficking Directive (2011/36) that includes forced begging as a 
‘possible form of exploitation.’
67
 The Trafficking Protocol does not explicitly refer to forced 
begging as form of exploitation, but rather leaves this open by providing the non-exhaustive 
list of examples of exploitation.
68
 
 
A recent ILO meeting considered begging as forced labour ‘when people are employed by 
someone to perform such activities and must give away whatever they obtained by doing 
so.’
69
 The ILO defines forced labour as ‘all work or service which is exacted from any person 
under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself 
voluntarily’.
70
 Facts and circumstances in the kidnapping and abduction of migrants clearly 
show that the relationship between the traffickers is not based on employment/work, and it 
is unclear how the meaning of service in the definition of forced labour applies. Therefore, 
the fact that hostages are forced to communicate with their relatives to beg for money, or 
the fact that families are forced to beg on the streets and in public places to collect ransom 
money, could have no importance to determine the existence of forced begging. Rather, 
coercing captives by torture is the most common method the traffickers use in order to 
facilitate payment by relatives. 
 
The situation can also be examined to see if it fits with organised begging where proof of 
employment relationship is not required. Organised begging is recognised as a separate form 
of trafficking-related exploitation by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.
71
 However the 
context of begging may be limited to situations where ‘children, elderly persons or disabled 
migrants…tend to beg in public places and on public transport.’
72
 The current trend of 
organised begging is derived by ‘consumer oriented demand’ and usually focuses more on 
engaging children for begging.
73
 An attempt to link ransom with this form of exploitation has 
to deal with the following major differences. Firstly, in organised begging, people who give 
money to the beggars are not controlled by the traffickers, whereas in trafficking for ransom, 
relatives of the captives are attached to the situation because their families and relatives are 
being abused inside the hostage camp. Secondly, with regards to organised begging, when 
beggars receive no or insufficient money through begging, traffickers can and often do simply 
interrupt the relation with the beggars.
74
 In the hostage camps, however, captives receiving a 
smaller amount than the traffickers receive extended threats and physical harm, while refusal 
                                            
66  L Lijnders & S Robinson, ‘From the Horn of Africa to the Middle East’, p. 143, ‘captives who do not have connections abroad 
often see their families forced to beg for money or sell their belongings such as jewellery, property and livestock for their 
release.’ See also M van Reisen et al., p. 80, ‘the refugees who find themselves in the houses of the Bedouins are regularly 
tortured while being forced to beg their relatives to send money.’ 
67  The EU Trafficking Directive also states: ‘Within the context of this Directive, forced begging should be understood as a form 
of forced labour or services as defined in the 1930 ILO Convention No. 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour.’ 
68  UNODC, Travaux Préparatoires, p. 344. 
69  ILO, ‘Forced labour and human trafficking’, 19th International Conference of Labour Statisticians, ILO,  Geneva,  2013  p. 9, 
retrieved 11 June 2014,  http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documents/meeting 
document/wcms_222037.pdf . Note: This was a meeting of statisticians, and thus this definition does not carry the weight of 
a convention for instance. 
70   Forced Labour Convention, 1930, No. 29, retrieved 04 February 2015, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:::NO:12100:P12100_ILO_CODE:C029:NO 
71 UNODC, ‘Human Trafficking Indicators’, retrieved 5 Jan 2014 http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-
trafficking/HT_indicators_E_LOWRES.pdf 
72   Ibid. 
73   I Cherneva, ‘Human Trafficking For Begging’, Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, 2011, p. 65. 
74   Ibid, p. 66.  
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to pay results in killing of the captive in retribution.
75
 Thirdly, people voluntarily give money 
to beggars, while relatives of the captives pay money due to the coercion and pressure from 
traffickers.
76
 Fourthly, in hostage camps, the amount of money to be received by the captives 
is fixed and sometimes negotiable, while in organised begging the amount is not fixed and no 
negotiation is made between the traffickers and the people on the street.
77
 
 
 
From the Trafficking Protocol to National Legislation and Policy 
The article has looked at ways in which trafficking for ransom can be included in 
interpretations of the UN Trafficking Protocol and has debated with others who have tried to 
make it fit by considering ransom a form of debt bondage or forced begging and thus 
trafficking. Considering it as exploitation in its own right however remains the most robust 
argument for definitional inclusion. Regarding impact of these semantics, the Trafficking 
Protocol and anything it might include or not include is irrelevant unless states amend or 
draft their national anti-trafficking legislation and policy to specifically include trafficking for 
ransom or to be broad enough to allow trafficking for ransom to easily fit definitional criteria 
of trafficking. Though the scope of this paper is limited to legal analysis, of course states’ 
implementation of appropriately worded and relevant legislation and policy must follow.  
 
In looking at the national legal arrangements in the Northeast African countries affected by 
the problem, it is evident that almost none of them have adequate legal frameworks and 
enforcement mechanisms. Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya and Yemen do not have comprehensive 
legal frameworks to suppress and punish trafficking committed inside or outside their 
territories. Only a few provisions are available in their respective criminal codes addressing 
limited aspects of trafficking and offering very limited protection.
78
 Egypt’s new law issued in 
2010 appears to be clearer than Article 3 of the Trafficking Protocol in defining the scope of 
exploitation but does not encompass ransom.
79
 The new Sudanese Anti-Trafficking Act, 
however, addresses the issue of trafficking for ransom, although it treats ransom as a distinct 
‘illegal objective’.  
 
Article 7 of the Sudanese Anti-Trafficking Act defines trafficking in persons as abducting 
persons or transferring or deporting or harbouring or receiving or detaining them to exploit or 
use them in illegal acts or to achieve illegal objectives for… material return or gain… through 
the ‘use of force or any form of coercion or kidnapping or fraud and deception or abuse of 
power and influence or the exploitation or abuse of a position of vulnerability or need.’
80
 The 
definition is wide enough in scope to very clearly include all forms of trafficking in persons 
through a broad interpretation of ‘exploitation’ that makes it possible to address exploitation 
beyond sexual exploitation, labour exploitation and removal of organs.  
 
                                            
75   HRW, ‘I Wanted to Lie Down and Die’, pp. 33, 34 & 37.  
76   Ibid., pp.1, 25 and 54; M van Reisen et al., p. 68. 
77   M van Reisen et al., p.43. 
78  Arts 605 and 565 of Proclamation No.1/91-Transitional Penal Code of Eritrea; Article 418 of the Penal Code of Libya; Articles 
596, 597 and 635 of Proclamation No.414/200-Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia; Article 248 
Criminal Code of Yemen.  
79   Article 2 of the Law Regarding Combating Human Trafficking, No.64/2010. The Act appears to have been modelled after the 
Trafficking Protocol. The catch-all phrase: ‘in any of its forms’ opens space for other forms of exploitation that are not only 
unnamed but also unforeseen. It also makes clear that exploitation could extend to forcing children to beg and engage in acts 
of pornography.   
80  Article 7 of  the Sudan Anti-Trafficking Act, 2013; the Article defines Illegal objectives as material returns, gains, or promises 
of return or gainor grants of any kind of benefits.  
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Purpose defined as using a victim to ‘achieve an illegal objective for material gain’ matches 
the basic feature of ransom as it aims directly at gaining monetary benefits. Importantly, 
using victims for gaining benefit does not involve victims’ labour or service since an 
employment relationship between traffickers and victims is never considered. Contravention 
with captives’ physical integrity by itself is not part of the definition of the purpose and 
instead is used as a means. Thus, circumstances of third party victimisation can possibly be 
included under the purpose of achieving the illegal objective more adequately. 
 
National legislation and policy both in the Northeast African region and elsewhere would 
usefully be amended to specifically include trafficking for ransom or to ensure definitional 
breadth wide enough to ensure trafficking for ransom easily fits definitional criteria of 
trafficking. Reports from the Middle East (Yemen), Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Myanmar and 
Thailand) and North America (Mexico) suggest that trafficking for ransom as a phenomenon 
does not necessarily have regional specificity and policymakers could benefit from legal 
analysis of the problem vis a vis the Trafficking Protocol as well as national legislation in 
Northeast African states where the problem is possibly most pervasive. 
 
 
Conclusion 
We have seen that trafficking for ransom meets commonly used definitions of exploitation, as 
traffickers benefit financially from ransom payments, through taking advantage of people 
they are holding. While ransom can be interpreted as exploitation, it does not share the same 
features of exploitation as the types that are specifically mentioned in the Protocol. 
Trafficking for ransom affects third parties for instance, and their victimisation needs 
additional legal exploration. Further, in trafficking for ransom, sexual exploitation, forced 
labour, slavery or practices similar to slavery are used as means to arrive at the end purpose 
of collecting ransom, while in other cases sexual exploitation etc., are in and of themselves 
the end purpose. The Sudanese Anti-Trafficking Act simplifies this by defining the end 
purpose of trafficking as using a victim ‘to achieve an illegal objective for material gain.’  
 
It is necessary for the worldwide effort against trafficking in persons to turn its face to forms 
of trafficking unforeseen at the time of the drafting of the Trafficking Protocol. It is also 
important to highlight the need to widen interpretations of the Protocol’s trafficking 
definition in order to properly address new forms of trafficking, with types of exploitation not 
explicitly mentioned as examples in the Protocol and those that go beyond the three common 
categories of labour exploitation, sexual exploitation and organ removal. It is equally 
important for the countries already affected by the problem to adopt new and comprehensive 
national legislation or to amend existing laws and policy in order to address new practices like 
trafficking for ransom. Limited to the context of trafficking, ransom can be understood as 
coercive or forceful transporting, transferring and harbouring or taking hostage of persons for 
the purpose of extortion of money in exchange for their release. It must be possible for 
interpretations of national law to encompass this. 
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